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In the current neoliberal era, feminist self-identification has
become a controversial terrain composed of myriad complex-
ities. Scholars put forward that young women in Western
Europe increasingly tend to disarticulate the “feminist” label,
claiming that gender equality is already achieved and feminism
is passé and unnecessary for contemporary social and political
world. (Budgeon, 2001; Rich, 2005; Scharff, 2013) Moreover, it
has been suggested that the neoliberal discourses of individu-
alism and self-liberation, which in return result in repudiation
of the feminist struggle for gender equality, are deeply embed-
ded in political discourses and popular culture in the Western
context today. (McRobbie, 2004, 2007) The rising anti-feminist
discourse in the current era can also be clearly tracked down in
the Turkish context with respect to the political agenda of
the pro-Islamist AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) [The Justice
and Development Party] government. Studies on AKP's gender
politics reveal that the party's policies and political discourseshave constantly reproduced traditional gender roles and
confined women to familial roles (Çitak & Tür, 2008; Coşar &
Yeğenoğlu, 2011). One can also allege that the patriarchal tones
in AKP discourses have been further reinforced through at-
tempts to disassociate feminism and gender equality and mar-
ginalize feminism as an extreme ideology. Keeping this anti-
feminist gender regime in mind, it is significant to ask how
feminist self-identification is negotiated in Turkey in this par-
ticular era marked by a striking proliferation of anti-feminist
political discourses.
The label “feminist” has always been very contentious in
the Turkish context as everywhere else; yet one can argue that in
a time period distinguished by the rise of anti-feminist dis-
courses, public negotiations of feminist self-identification display
multiple layers of complexity that are difficult to disentangle.
This complex character of feminist self-identification in contem-
porary Turkey becomes even more intricate when vulnerable
subject positions in the public sphere are taken into account. To
comprehend how vulnerabilities in the public sphere influence
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contemporary Turkey, this qualitative study examines pious
women columnists' narratives on Islam, feminism, and Islamic
feminism. In this way, it aims to gain a thorough insight into the
narrative lines that pious women columnists resort to while
explaining their relationship to feminism.
To this end, I will firstly discuss the anti-feminist tones
underlying the gender politics of the AKP government and
the discursive field in which anti-feminist discourses are
reproduced through certain discursive opportunity struc-
tures. Having pointed out the high circulation of anti-
feminist discourses in public debates, I will delineate the
peculiarities of pious women columnists' position in the
contemporary social and political context in Turkey. Since
every subject in the public sphere speaks from a particular
location, experience, and context, it is vitally important
to take into account research participants' positionality and
situatedness. In this sense, the concepts of “positionality”
and “situated reasoning,” which connote a continuous
engagement of the self into social and political reality
(Alcoff, 2006: 94–95), provide a useful theoretical basis for
the purposes of this study. These concepts enable one to see
that judgments, perceptions, and demands are formed
through the horizon of meanings available to subjects at a
particular time and place. Making use of this theoretical
perspective, this paper discusses pious women columnists'
narratives on Islam, feminism, and feminist identity with a par-
ticular reference to the peculiarities of the interpretive horizons
available to them in the current era. This context-based nar-
rative analysis, in return, may provide us an understanding of
how public vulnerabilities configure the contours of feminist
self-identification in neoliberal times marked by a striking pro-
liferation of anti-feminist discourses.The rise of the anti-feminist discursive regime under the
AKP rule
In the last decade, the main characteristics of Turkish
politics has been subject to a radical change as a result of the
rise of the pro-Islamist Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and
Development Party] (AKP). For the first time in Turkish politics,
a pro-Islamist political party could get the majority of the
votes in four successive general elections, i.e., in 2002, 2007,
2011, and 2015, and has ruled the country with a new Islamist
thinking marked by pragmatism rather than religious princi-
ples (Çavdar, 2006). As a part of this Islamic resurgence,
conservatization in socio-cultural and politicalmatters has come
to the foreground. The party's approach to women's issues can
be seen as a litmus test through which this conservatization
crystallizes.
In the AKP's conservative politics, being awoman is first and
foremost defined within the familial sphere through tradition-
al gender codes (Çitak & Tür, 2008; Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2011;
Unal & Cindoğlu, 2013). To protect family unity, the AKP gov-
ernment aims to reinforce a strong commitment among citi-
zens to themoral and political importance of the family ideal. It
has attempted to implement policies to consolidate this ideal as
a regulative principle in the social and moral imagination.
Pronatalist policies constitute a main pillar of AKP's pro-family
politics. Stressing the need for a young population in hisspeeches, PM Erdoğan frequently advises married couples to
have at least three children:
“One or two children mean bankruptcy. Three children
meanwe are not improving but not receding either. At least
three children are necessary in each family, because our
population risks aging.” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013).
In addition to such pronatalist discourses defining the ideal
number of children, the recent anti-abortion policy initiative
could be identified as another reflection of this pronatalist
vision. Upon Erdoğan's remarks in a public meeting in 2012,
stating that abortion is murder (Radikal newspaper, 2012), a
policy initiative appeared on the political agenda, which is
designed to considerably reduce the time limit defined in law
for the use of the right to abortion. Moreover, following this
policy initiative, certain legal arrangements have been made,
which restrict c-sections to medical emergencies. Through
regulating women's reproductive capacities and their rights on
their bodies, such discourses and policy initiatives seewomen's
womb as a policy area that can be easily utilized for political
purposes (Unal & Cindoğlu, 2013). The result of this conserva-
tive emphasis on women's roles as mothers and wives is that
familial roles assigned to women in the private sphere turn out
to be the decisive element for their life choices.
Another major component of this patriarchal regime under
the AKP rule is the articulation of distaste of feminist ideas. As
in other prevalent streotypical accounts, feminism in AKP's
discourses is closely associated with man-hating, extremism,
and clash betweenmen and women. In a meeting organized in
2008 by the party's women's branches, Dengir Mir Fırat, AKP's
former vice president, stated that feminist ideas foster the
opposition between sexes and women from AKP cannot be
slaves to feminism:
“Our view as AKP on women is very different from other
parties and other segments of society. We do not support
the clash between men and women as envisioned in the
philosophical ideas in feminist thought. Women from AKP
have never been slaves to feminism and never will be.
Because we believe that men and women are inseperable
and they complement each other.” (Radikal newspaper,
2008)
On the other hand, in 2004, when hundreds of women
gathered in front of the parliament in Ankara to protest the
draft bill criminalizing adultery1 and shouted slogans “our
bodies and sexuality belong to ourselves,” PM Erdoğan
expressed his anger by labeling the women activists as
marginal:
“There were even those who marched to Ankara, carrying
placards that do not suit the Turkish woman. I cannot
applaud such behavior that does not suit our traditions and
moral values… A marginal group cannot represent Turkish
women.” (Vatan newspaper, 2004)
The statements above clearly designate that feminism and
the feminist movement in the AKP mindset is coded as
antithetical to the image of the “ideal Turkish woman.” In this
anti-feminist discourse, feminism is further marginalized for
14 D. Unal / Women's Studies International Forum 53 (2015) 12–21being inherently prone to clash between sexes. As a result, it
becomes the “other” of AKP's gender politics and is distanced
from the party ideology altogether.
AKP's anti-feministmentality also interprets “gender equal-
ity” as an alien concept, arguing that it does not comply
with the party principles derived from Islamic values. The
Dolmabahçe meeting, which was organized in 2008 to foster
the dialog between the government and women's organiza-
tions yet resulted in sheer disappointment for feminists, is
evidently reflective of the rejection of the concept of gender
equality in the AKPmindset. During the course of this meeting,
upon the question as to why he always frames the position of
women within the confines of motherhood, PM Erdoğan took
the initiative to elaborate on his views on gender equality and
made the following statement:
“After all, I don't believe in the equality of men and women.
Therefore, I prefer to say equality of opportunity. Women
andmen are different, they are complementary [mütemmim]
to each other.” (Vatan newspaper, 2010)
Erdoğan's remarks above replace the idea of gender equality
with the religious concept of “fıtrat” [disposition], which
suggests that each and every being has its peculiar existence
and is equipped with unique capabilities (Badran, 2009).
Relying on the Islamic thought, Erdoğan intrinsically differen-
tiates between male and female dispositions by seeing them as
a part of the whole. Rather than talking about the equality of
men and women, he promotes an understanding of equality of
genders as human beings.
The discursive framework portrayed above clearly discloses
the anti-feminist narrative lines in AKP politicians' speech acts.
Instead of treating such speech acts in isolation, it is necessary
to situate them within the existing discursive regime, iden-
tify their relation with statements having similar tones, and
evaluate their effects on public debates. Drawing on the
Foucauldian conception of discourse, Hall (2001: 73) states
that discourse never consists of one statement, one text, or one
action; the same discourse appears across a range of texts and
speech acts. Accordingly, discursive statements that share
similar motifs and narrative lines are products of the same
discursive regime and generate certain discursive opportunity
structures, enhancing political acceptability of certain ideas.
According to Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002),
discourses that used to remain hidden or unnoticed may
becomehighly visible in another discursive regime.Making use
of the opportunity structures provided by the change in the
governing rules of thediscursive regime, certain speakers in the
public sphere can articulate certain ideas more aloud or
effectively. In this sense, one can allege that the rise of the
anti-feminist discourse in government officials' speeches and
the attempts to solidify it through legal arrangements expand
the boundaries of the anti-feminist discourses in many other
realms of the public sphere in contemporary Turkey. As a result,
such discourses are extensively featured in the mass media
forum, gain a widespread circulation in public debates, and
become quite influential in shaping the trajectory of public
debates on gender issues.
How do pious women columnists in contemporary Turkey
position themselves vis-a-vis the rising anti-feminist discur-
sive regime? As crucial intellectual actors, do they engage in acounter hegemonic attempt to challenge the patriarchal fixa-
tion of meaning in the realm of gender relations? In the light of
these questions, this study investigates pious women colum-
nists' positionality in the current hegemonic discursive regime
in contemporary Turkey and the horizon of meanings that they
rely onwhile constructing narratives on their relationship with
feminism and feminist identity.
Situating veiling and veiled women in the Turkish context
Along the course of Turkish modernization, the deepest
intellectual and emotional gaps between the modern West
and Islam have come to the foreground most strikingly at the
level of gender relations. The image of modern woman in the
Republican mindset was a strategic means to prove Turkey's
breakwith its past and its belonging to theWestern civilization
(Çınar, 2005). In line with this goal, the modern Kemalist
woman was defined as a woman who actively participates in
public life and is liberated from religious or cultural constraints
of the intimate sphere. In this understanding, women had to
make a radical choice about whether to be Western or be a
Muslim (Göle, 1997: 86). Veiled women were perceived as the
epitomes of the Orient, the traditional, the backward, and the
“other” of the Kemalist modern women. Accordingly, being
veiled and being a modern woman were thought to be at odds
with each other in the Republican modernization project.
This bifurcation amongwomen in terms of code of attire has
gained new dimensions in the post-1980 period. Islam that has
been condemned to being the other of the urban, the rational,
themodern, of what Kemalism praised, emerged in this decade
in a quite different form that secularists did not know before.
The headscarf was nomore a matter of poor, rural, uneducated
women but has acquired new connotations in the city (Genel &
Karaosmanoğlu, 2006). Young, urban, well-educated veiled
women with professional identities have contributed to the
redefinition of the meanings of veiling by displaying autono-
mous identities and asking for an all-inclusive public sphere.
Presenting veiling as an act of free will and agency, they have
discarded the essentializing Republican assumption that asso-
ciates veiling with submission to patriarchy. As a result, they
have revealed that old paradigms about veiling cannot ex-
plain the newly emerging dynamics of urban veiled women's
identities.
The new generation of well-educated, urban veiled women
have not only challenged the orthodox secularist Republican
front but also contested the patriarchal dynamics of the rising
Islamist politics. Especially those who have zealously worked
for the mobilization of voters but were eventually excluded
from the Islamist party cadres have posed serious criticisms
against the symbolization of veiled women's identities and
trivialization of their demands in Islamist politics in the 1990s
and 2000s.2
The unrest among veiled women about the headscarf bans
and the utilization of their identities has particularly risen in
the final years of the AKP government. For a very long time, the
AKP delayed political action to improve veiled women's rights
in order to rebuff the opposition through a moderate stance
and achieve other political goals with high priority such as
winning elections. The party could attempt to lift the headscarf
bans only in the aftermath of 2007 elections. In 2008, the
AKP passed important constitutional amendments, making
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universitieswith headscarf. In 2013, through a democratization
package announced on September 30, it lifted the ban on
wearing headscarves in public offices. Accordingly, public
servants except prosecutors, judges, and military personnel
acquired the right towear headscarf in public offices. However,
these recent improvements in the status of veiling could not
eradicatemistrust and disappointment in veiled women's state
of mind arising from AKP's long-lasting reluctance to lift the
bans.
AKP's reluctance to lift the headscarf bans in public insti-
tutions has been severely criticized by pious women colum-
nists. Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal (2011) argued that for the last
decade the AKP has ignored veiled women's efforts contribut-
ing to the party's electoral success and even prohibited the
political attempts to grant veiledwomen the right to be elected.
For Tuksal, this clearly shows that AKP's approach to veiled
women is no different from the orthodox Republican under-
standing. In an interview that she gave to the press, Tuksal
maintains that the AKP administration is aware of the fact that
they are the only alternative for veiledwomen and can get their
votes in any case:
“Unless the issue of headscarf is resolved, veiled women
would not vote for another party. But the resolution of this
problem would lead to the dispersion of the votes. As a
result, the AKP may cease to be the only option.” (Taraf
newspaper, 2012)
PM Erdoğan's disdainful approach to the campaign “No
Veiled Deputy No Vote”3 initiated in 2011 by veiled women
activists and his interpretation of the campaign as an undem-
ocratic, improper bargain further exacerbated pious women
columnists' critique. As a response to PM Erdoğan, Nihal
Bengisu Karaca (2011), a columnist in daily Habertürk, stated
that veiled women's demands to be elected as MPs is a cry for a
fundamental human right, not a bargain.
As pious women columnists' criticisms reveal, if one great
obstacle to veiled women's position in society is the prevailing
orthodox Republican discourses and the constraining legal
framework, the other one is the discursive utilization of their
identities in Islamist politics. Accordingly, the commonsensical
assumption that veiled women's status in society has been
irreversibly improved under the pro-Islamist AKP government
that has remained in power for over a decade seems to be
untrue. The age-old confrontation between the Islamist and
Republican camps continues to reproduce itself through the
symbolization of veiled women's identities for political pur-
poses both in orthodox Republican and pro-Islamist political
discourses. The interviews conducted in this study clearly
demonstrate that pious women still feel vulnerable in the
public sphere in contemporary Turkey as the utilitarian
discourses applying to their identities remain intact.
Pious women columnists as crucial intellectual figures
The political struggles fought at universities over the issue
of headscarf in the 1980s was succeeded by the emergence of
pious women as influential actors in the intellectual arena in
the 1990s. Starting with this period, pious women began to
publish a considerable number of books—novels, collections ofstory stories, research books, doctoral theses—and attained
crucial roles in the media sector.
These pious intellectual women are modern, urban, highly
educated women who write not only for the Islamist com-
munity but also for the general public. Their weekly columns
have appeared in Islamist newspapers as well as in mass
circulation secular newspapers. In addition to publishing books
andwriting articles for journals and newspapers, some of them
engaged in political activities to increase the electoral success
of Islamist parties. Others have contributed to the foundation of
civil society organizations that aim to enhance veiled women's
status in society. In sum, the 1990s and especially the 2000s,
have witnessed the emergence of pious women as influential
public figures in different realms such as literature, journalism,
politics, and activism.
The Republican definition of “ideal woman,” which
established a binary opposition between veiling and the sym-
bolic and cultural capital in the Bourdieuan sense, is clearly
challenged in the very persona of pious intellectual women
who have left their imprint on the intellectual field. One should
underline that the main difficulty that pious women have
to confront in the intellectual field is not specifically their
religiosity but their being a religious woman. This means that
the challenges of being a pious woman writer have a dual
character. On the one hand, pious women intellectuals have to
struggle against the orthodox Republican reflexes of the intel-
lectual field. Even though most of them write in pro-Islamist
newspapers or magazines, as public intellectual figures appeal-
ing to wider audiences, their competence is frequently ques-
tioned as there is no conception of “veiled woman intellectual”
in the Republican psyche. On the other hand, they also have to
struggle against the patriarchal mind-set in the Islamist
community. Being a well-educated woman writer who writes
for national newspapers in a gender-conscious tone is a great
challenge to the patriarchal gender relations in orthodox
Islamist communities that confinewomen to traditional gender
roles at home.
Pious women writers' dual critique of the Republican and
Islamist fronts characterizes their quest for autonomous iden-
tities and distinguishes them from earlier generation of pious
women writers. Opposing ideological projects that utilize
their identities for broader social and political goals, the new
generation of pious women writers attempt to find out novel
ways of reconciling Islam with a gender-conscious thinking.
Çayır (2007) notes that beginning with the 1990s, the writings
of pious women writers have begun to display a considerably
individualistic tone when compared to the earlier examples.
Unlike the novels written in the 1980s with the aim to defend
Islam against Westernized, secular lifestyles, the new form of
Islamic novels in the 1990s deals with protagonists' ques-
tionings of religiosity, urban life, marriage, and love. This stress
on women protagonists' inner conflicts and questionings
reveals that the new generation of pious women writers in
the 1990s regard writing as an inherent part of their quest to
find out new ways to express their authentic selves.
While regardingwriting as an empowering act that enables
one to contest the marginalized aspects of identities, pious
women columnists under consideration in this study also state
that rather than being a free choice, writing for them has
always been the last resort where they can go after having been
rejected many times elsewhere. The hardships of performing
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have rendered them obliged to write columns or novels. In
this sense, it is noteworthy to remember that each narrative
that they produce, including the interviews in this study, is a
manifestation of their discontent with the social, political, and
cultural context. As pioneer women in the public sphere who
have struggled against the entrenched secular-Islamist divide
and the discriminatory state policies since the 1980s, pious
women columnists speak from a vulnerable position that
prompts them to produce cautious narratives through different
strategies and elusive, intricate narrative lines. Their narratives
remindus thatmarginalization of veiling and violation of veiled
women's rights is an ongoing phenomenon in contemporary
Turkey since recent legal achievements regarding veiling do
not necessarily lead to the elimination of discriminatory dis-
courses from society altogether. Therefore, as we will see
below, pious women columnists negotiate feminist identity
from within a frame of reference that reflects the myriad axes
of vulnerabilities underlying their peculiar position in the
public sphere.
About the research
This study relies on in-depth semi-structured interviews
conducted with four pious women columnists, Hidayet
Şefkatli Tuksal, Nihal Bengisu Karaca, Sibel Eraslan and Yıldız
Ramazanoğlu, between January 2013 and June 2013. The
writers interviewed in this study are influential figures who
prolifically contribute to public debates and shape the public
opinion in the Turkish context.
Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, who earned her doctoral degree
in 1998 with a dissertation titled Kadın Karşıtı Söylemin İslam
Geleneğindeki İzdüşümü (The Trajectory of the Misogynist
Discourse in the Islamic Tradition), has written columns for
Star and Taraf newspapers respectively between 2009 and
2012 and 2012–2013. In addition, Tuksal has been quite active
in Islamist women's movement and has taken up a leading role
in the foundation of Başkent KadınPlatformu (CapitalWomen's
Platform), a women's organization led by pious women. Nihal
Bengisu Karaca began her journalistic career in 1994 in Aksiyon,
a weekly journal, where she later became an editor for the arts
page. She also worked for Kanal 7 as a copywriter and program
director. She wrote columns for Zaman newspaper, the weekly
journal Yeni Aktüel, and currentlywrites for the dailyHabertürk.
Sibel Eraslan has written in mainstream national newspapers
with a pro-Islamist stance, such as Yeni Şafak, Vakit, and Star.
In addition to her journalistic career, she has also published
novels, collections of short stories, and research books. Finally,
Yıldız Ramazanoğlu has published ten books, including novels,
collections of short stories, and essays. She has also contributed
to national newspapers and journals and has participated in
international women's submits as representatives of human
rights and women's organizations.
The interviews in this study focus on women writers' ideas
about feminism, feminist identity, and Islamic feminism, there-
by aiming to reveal how they narrate their relationship to
feminism in the current era. Acknowledging that feminist
identity is not a monolithic entity, this study takes into account
the complexity of feminist identity claims, different shades of
feminist positions (weak, strong, etc.), and different reasonings
(strategic, ideological, practical, etc.) involved in the negotiationof feminist identity. Moreover, it avoids from providing a list
of predictors for measuring feminist identity and defining
what feminism is. The fixation of feminism's meanings and
the ideological components of feminist identity through
operationalizing a list of predictors would be contrary to the
aims of this study. Rather than evaluating women colum-
nists' negotiation of feminist identity according to a fixed
set of predictors, the aim here is to grasp how women
columnists themselves operationalize feminist identity and
what kind of narrative lines they use while approaching to
the issue of feminist self-identification. In this sense, this
study aims to examine women columnists' narratives on
feminist self-identification by adopting a critical approach to
essentialist interpretations of identity labels that fail to account
for dynamic and multi-layered subject positionalities.
Pious women columnists' narratives on feminism, Islamic
feminism, and feminist identity
When it comes to certain issues, pious women columnists
display a critical stance vis-a-vis the patriarchal tones charac-
terizing AKP's gender politics and the rising anti-feminist
discourses in contemporary Turkey. For example, regarding
the recent debates about the anti-abortion policy initiative in
2012, they openly opposed the government's attempts to
impose restrictions on the right to abortion.4 Moreover, as
noted earlier, they have posed harsh criticisms against the
AKP's inertia that prevented it for a very long time from taking
policy steps to improve veiled women's rights and liberties. In
addition, they severely criticize the misogynist discourses of
leading male intellectuals in the Islamist community. The
criticisms that they pose against Ali Bulaç, an Islamist writer
who argues against women's employment on the grounds that
it imperils the family unity, are emblematic of their alert,
critical stance vis-a-vis the high circulation of patriarchal state-
ments in the Islamist community.5 Yet, this promising possi-
bility of alliancewith the feminist subaltern public is hampered
when pious women columnists define feminism in stereotyp-
ical terms in order to disarticulate close association with it.
Their narratives in this regard vary considerably depending
on the social and political context and the secular feminist
movement's approach to veiling and Islam. This study has
shown that if the threat perception against Islamic selves and
veiled women's position in society rises, then pious women
columnists may clearly put a distance between themselves and
the secular feminist subaltern public.
In this frame, one can suggest that piouswomen columnists'
critique of the secular feminist movement in Turkey has a
significant influence over their approach to feminist self-
identification and their conception of the coexistence of Islam
and feminism. The autonomous feminist movement, when first
emerged in the post-1980 era, was organized by middle class,
well-educated, secular women and failed to incorporate veiled
women's demands into its discourse. The divide between
secular and religiouswomen has come to be challenged only in
the 1990swith the emergence of cleavages andmultiplicities in
feminist demands. Islamist and Kurdish women as well as the
lesbian–gay-bisexual–transsexual (LGBT)movements have led
to the disintegration of the monolithic conceptions of gender
relations in Turkey and helped bring about a dramatic change
in the history of feminist movements (Diner & Toktaş, 2010).
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led secular feminism to self-reflexive questioning of their basic
premises and pointed out the necessity of adopting a stance
that accommodates pluralities.
During the interviews I have observed that pious women
columnists construct a cautious yet at the same time optimistic
narrative on the secular feminist movement in Turkey. The
stress on dialog andmutual understanding is a recurrent theme
in their narrative lines. While explaining her position on
feminism and the feminist movement, Sibel Eraslan makes
the following statement:
“Cooperation, love, friendship... I take these concepts quite
seriously. It is important thatwe can convey information via
women's experiences and acts. Despite all the disagree-
ments between us, whenever we, women in the media and
literature, come together, we have always learned some-
thing from each other... I have come across good feminist
women whomake me feel secure, encourage me and make
me laugh. I was lucky, I guess... Thus, feminism means
friendship and solidarity for me...”
In a similar vein, cooperation is a prominent theme in Yıldız
Ramazanoğlu's narrativewhere she argues thatwomenneed to
live together side by side by acknowledging the importance of
dialog:
“We do not have the luxury to live in our ghettos and
produce constant opposition against each other. Everyone
has a lot to share with each other... If we care to listen to
each other, we can figure out how our differences can
crosscut each other. Otherwise we become ghettoized to
particular communities… We should not suffocate one
another like this, condemning differences to certain identity
categories.”
This particular stress on cooperation, solidarity, and dialog
represents an intersection pointwhere Islamic references meet
secular feminist ideals, generating a newposition in between. It
could be read as an expression of hybridity, dynamism, and
change, which prepares the ground for a constant learning
process from others' experiences. In this sense, pious women
columnists' narratives expose novel, dialogic ways in which
essentialist identity categories and the orthodox arguments
defining Islam and feminism in binary opposition can be
deconstructed.
Opposing the argument that Islam is a misogynist religion
and Islamic practices are inherently against women's rights,
Ramazanoğlu gives examples from thehistory of Islampointing
out the dignity and respect that women enjoyed in the Islamic
tradition:
“Ontologically Islam is not a religion that suppresses
women; rather, the opposite is true. There was this past
tradition in Islam that urged fathers to rise out of respect
when their daughters enter into the room. Each time when
Fatima entered the room, our prophet rised because of his
affection and respect for her.”
Having justified the compatibility of Islam and feminism,
Ramazanoğlu states that reading feminism through Islamiclenses enhances her conception of feminism and vice versa.
She maintains that feminism gains a new perspective through
a reading that is informed by the Islamic conception of equity
[hakkaniyet], which, for Ramazanoğlu, is a concept that is
superior to the feminist ideal of equality. It is based on the
compatibility of men and women and forms expectations or
allocates tasks and responsibilities according to the ontological
capacities of both genders. Ramazanoğlu also denotes that
when read in the light of the feminist framework, Islamic verses
acquire new meanings beyond the patriarchal interpretations
and the Qur'an is reconciledwith contemporary feminist ideals.
Therefore, she stresses that it is not possible to grasp the Qur'an
fully without acknowledging the usefulness of feminist schol-
arship first. In sum, while reconciling her Islamic faith and her
feminist stance, Ramazanoğlu utilizes the conceptual tools of
the Islamic framework at one point and those of the feminist
thought at another, which makes her narrative quite flexible.
Therefore, one can argue that her conception of Islamic femi-
nism corresponds to a very peculiar standpoint that makes
it impossible to locate it into a stable category. Since her
interpretive framework constantly shifts between Islamic and
feminist standpoints, neither Islam nor feminism constitutes
the permanent linchpin of Ramazanoğlu's conception of Islamic
feminism. Rather, it is the dialectical relationship between
Islam and feminism that makes her conception of Islamic
feminism unique.
Similar to Ramazanoğlu, Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal states that
she constantly revises and renegotiates themeanings of Islamic
feminism by engaging in a critical reading of both Islam and
feminism:
“In the past everyone had to believewhat the local religious
leader said... But in time we, as women theologians, formed
our own interpretations of the Qur'an and escaped the
tyranny of misogynist interpretations… I believe that femi-
nism refreshes my mind; it provides me alternative
perspectives… Yet, I have reservations about the feminist
discourse of gender equality. Which women are granted
equality on the basis of feminist principles? …I think about
feminist principles a lot. I cannot think of myself saying
‘feminism endorses this, so I definitely have to accept it like
this; I don't like this rigidity.’”
Tuksal denotes that Islam and feminism can be read in the
light of each other in such a way that in the end they come to
embrace multiplicities and different subject positions. In this
sense, Tuksal's narrative is marked by a pendulum movement
oscillating between feminist and Islamist frameworks. At
certain points, she puts the emphasis on the feminist rereading
of Islam; at other points, she prioritizes the Islamic framework
and elaborates on exclusionary aspects of feminism that
marginalize pious selves.
This dynamism and hybridity, which characterizes the
narratives above, shift towards a more stable position in Nihal
Bengisu Karaca's interview. Even though Karaca acknowledges
that Islam and feminism can transform each other, she clearly
identifies the Islamic framework as the keystone in the idea of
Islamic feminism:
“What is important here is to disclose the ties that Islamic
feminism has with the secular form of feminism in the
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Islamic framework should be maintained as its reference
point… If secular feminism constitutes the center of gravity
in our conceptions of Islamic feminism, then you cannot call
it Islamic…”
In this frame, one can conclude that pious women col-
umnists acknowledge the coexistence of Islam and feminism
and the transformative effects of the relationship in between,
though in differing degrees. While some of the writers put
a stronger stress on dialog and endorse hybrid standpoints
where Islam and feminism engage in a dialectical relationship,
constantly transforming each other, others adopt a stable
position that prioritize Islam as the main reference point.
On the other hand, in all narratives, the call for dialog is
accompanied by a cautious narrative line that reminds us of
the still intact character of vulnerabilities underlying veiled
women's positionality in contemporary Turkey. Pious women
columnists particularly underscore that marginalizing dis-
courses and violations of veiled women's rights and liberties
are still in force in contemporary Turkey. In this regard, Tuksal's
remarks are quite telling:
“A flea that is kept in a bottle can jump only as much as the
bottle's height. It can jump only this much even after it is
released…Our feelings of confinement are still intact under
the AKP rule… It was only in the third period of the AKP rule
that veiled women have begun to enter universities with
their headscarves and participated into theworkforce… Yet
still, there is no legal guarantee to protect their veiled
identities. Everybody knows that if another party replaces
the AKP rule, all the achievements so far may vanish... Thus,
we haven't started to dream yet…”
Tuksal's quotation above puts forward that pious women
columnists negotiate identity categories in a context which,
they think, still subjects them to a myriad axes of vulnerabil-
ities. Contesting identity labels that deny multiple facets of
identities and fix subject positions into hierarchically defined
categories, pious women columnists are quite suspicious of
identity labels such as “veiled woman” or “Islamist woman
writer.” They think that such labels are used in the public
discourse with the aim to confine pious women's identities to
an inferior essence.
This critical approach to identity categories encapsulates
a deconstructive possibility to dismantle essentialist con-
ceptions. On the other hand, at certain points, it falls short in
providing a new ground where identities can be reconfigured
as dynamic entities that allow subjects useful vantage points to
make sense of their position in the social world (Alcoff, 2006).
The tendency to code identity labels as inherently repressive
constitutes a major obstacle imperiling the redefinitions of
identities as enabling, multiple, and open to revision.
Vulnerabilities embedded in pious women columnists'
positionality prevent them from clearly differentiating be-
tween essentialist impositions fromoutside and deconstructive
possibilities to redefine identities as multiple and dynamic.
As Alcoff (2006: 9) clearly points out, identities acquire their
meaning as a result of complex processes of interpreting and
working through a particular social location. They are never
simply there before interpretation; their negotiation dependson the subject's experiences deeply grounded in her social
location (Lloyd, 2005). Thus, rather than thinking of iden-
tity negotiations as processes that take place in isolation,
one should acknowledge the peculiarities pertaining to the
positionality of the subject in question and how this peculiar
situatedness in return generates a frame of reference for the
negotiation of identities. In this sense, the ways in which pious
women columnists position themselves vis-a-vis the anti-
feminist discourses in contemporary Turkey, the secular femi-
nist movement, and the idea of Islamic feminism can only be
grasped by closely examining the interpretive site where they
engage in meaning making processes. The discursive gender
regime and pious women columnists' self-positioning in con-
temporary Turkey, which I have tried to portray so far, give us
significant clues to make sense of their approach to feminism.
Pious women columnists' approach to feminist self-
identification further provides us a useful ground to compre-
hend the peculiarities of their positionality. For example,
Eraslan's narrative in this regard is highly indicative of the
tactical strategies that pious women columnists resort to while
talking about their relationship with feminist identity:
“I do not openly say that I ama feminist. But they always call
me Islamic feminist. If I have to say something, I use the
term ‘women's consciousness’... I prefer this shelter against
all those traditional views criticizing feminism... Together
with some friends, we use this phrase to explain our
sensitivity without using the word ‘feminist’. It protects
me...”
The statement above clearly demonstrates the strategical
gist in the disarticulation of feminist identity. Such strategical
tactics can be interpreted as discursive tools utilized to avoid
social ostracism associated with feminist self-identification
both in secular and Islamist communities.
Another approach to feminist self-identification that stands
out in pious women columnists' narratives is the reconfig-
uration of the meanings underlying feminist identity in line
with the peculiarities of Islamic feminism. The line of reasoning
in this approach can be evidently traced in Ramazanoğlu's
narrative. When I ask her to define her relationship to femi-
nism, Ramazanoğlu states that she is a “fragile feminist.” For
her, a fragile feminist is someone who criticizes feminism in
terms of many aspects but at the same time takes the feminist
acquisitions seriously and interprets the world through the
feminist framework:
“I can definemyself as a fragile feminist but this has nothing
to dowith beingdefined as feminist fromoutside…A fragile
feminist position criticizes feminism, acknowledges its
weaknesses but at the same time makes use of its accom-
plishments. It even includes a better understanding of
Qur'an in the mirror of feminism…”
Ramazanoğlu stresses that she would accept to be called as
“feminist” only if she herself defines what “feminist” means.
Her stance vis-a-vis feminism is composed of a sui generis
combination of a particular critique of feminist ideas and a
reinterpretation of them through Islamic lenses. In this sense,
the label “fragile feminist” used by Ramazanoğlu refers to a
very peculiar position in which Islam and feminism get mixed
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feminist” obviously entails an affirmation of feminist identity
yet it also connotes a particular distance with feminism.
Similar to Ramazanoğlu, Tuksal uses a peculiar terminology
when asked to define her relationship with feminist identity.
She defines her stance as a “sui generis feminist” position and
calls herself as a “thinking feminist”who constantly deliberates
feminist ideas:
“I think about feminist ideas a lot… Therefore, I amprobably
a thinking feminist. Always questioning, always in search…
Since the time when I first came across the feminist
literature, I have always adopted this critical stance… I still
try to negotiate feminist ideas and understand what good
they do to me.”
For Tuksal, the attempt to reconcile Islam and feminism
is a relentless endeavor marked by shifts, instabilities, and
questionings. This flexible approach to feminist identity does
not imply a tactical move utilized to distance the self from
feminism. On the contrary, Tuksal strongly affirms feminist
self-identification by denoting the following:
“I have greatly benefited from the feminist literature and
feminist research methods. In addition, I believe that the
rights that women enjoy today have been achieved mainly
thanks to feminist struggles. Therefore, if someone asks
mewhether I call myself feminist, I do not want to say ‘No, I
am not a feminist’. Because I find the feminist struggle
significant…”.
On the other hand, one should keep in mind that this firm
commitment to feminist identity may also involve strategic
concerns that modify the tone of the public articulation of
feminist identity in accordance with the public context.
Regarding this, Tuksal states that in big conferences or
meetings where the compatibility of Islam and feminism is
questioned, she feels the need to explain in detail what kind of
feminism she has in mind. In this sense, Tuksal's narrative
clearly reveals that articulation of a feminist position does not
simply encapsulate the negotiation of feminist identity claims
but also entails positioning vis-a-vis the public reception of the
identity in question. From here, one can conclude that pious
women's public articulation of feminist identity is heavily
dependent on the public from which they speak. Their artic-
ulation of feminist identity position may get stronger or
weaker, as they enter into different publics with different
attitudes towards feminist self-identification and veiling.
Tuksal's following statement is quite meaningful in this regard:
“Your feminist identity is welcomed in feminist circles
while it is seen as a flaw in the Islamist community. The vice
versa applies to your Islamist identity. You always have to
face this dilemma.”
Drawing on the statement above, one can argue that
Tuksal's multiple belongings to Islamist and feminist commu-
nities and the discursive lines that accompany each identity
position make it difficult for her to use stable identity labels.
In opposition to Tuksal's strong identification with femi-
nism, Karaca strictly refuses to define her identity positionthrough the label “feminist.” She thinks that identity labels are
restrictive in that they confine the self to a particular position
while ignoring other aspects of life. Uponmy askingwhere she
locates herself within the Islamic feminist framework, Karaca
states the following:
“I am not a person who confines herself to a single identity
position. Neither do I definemyself only as a mother, nor as
a veiled woman andMuslim... Therefore, I would not define
myself only as feminist or Islamic feminist either.”
This stance shows us that for Karaca, self-identificationwith
a particular identity position precludes belonging to other
identity positions and thus cannot be reconciled with multiple
belonging. In addition to her conception of identity labels as
restrictive and uni-dimensional, another reason for Karaca to
distance herself from Islamic feminist self-identification could
be related to her critique of secular feminisms. In her mind-set,
feminisms' secular character is so dominant that it leaves little
room to re-interpret feminist premises through the Islamic
framework. In this line of thought, feminist self-identification
corresponds to a fixed set of premises that cannot be revised in
line with one's needs and demands. It is quite paradoxical that
despite her call for revision of essentialist, exclusionary aspects
of secular feminism, Karaca fixes themeanings of feminismand
feminist identity as inherently monolithic and exclusionary.
This essentialist fixation discards the possibility of recon-
figuring hybrid, dynamic and multiple identity positions in
the realm of feminist politics.
As seen so far, pious women columnists' approaches to
feminist self-identification constitute a wide, heterogenous
array of identity positions, ranging from disavowal of identity
categories to strategic tactics, from differentiation between
being defined from outside and self-definition, to acknowledg-
ment of contradictions embedded in multiple belonging. In
this frame, different concerns and frames of reference influ-
ence pious women columnists' negotiation of feminist self-
identification in contemporary Turkey. While all writers in
this study resort to various strategic tactics in their narratives to
avoid stigmatization and negative labeling, some openly
declare themselves as Islamic feminist and others rigidly deny
any such labeling.
Conclusion
Every subject in the public sphere speaks from a particular
location, experience, and context (Alcoff, 2006). The frame of
reference inwhich the subject is embedded influences how she
sees and interprets the social facts around her. In this sense, as
seen in the discussions so far, pious women columnists' posi-
tion in the public sphere maps out the contours of their nego-
tiation of feminism, Islamic feminism, and feminist identity
in contemporary Turkey. Their highly contingent and
contextual narratives point out the vulnerable aspects of
their positionalities and underscore that negotiation of
identity categories always takes place within the frame of
reference that is formed in line with one's position in the
power configuration in society.
As pioneer women in the social and political life in Turkey,
who have publicly contested discriminations against veiling and
veiled women since the post-1980s, pious women columnists
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criticize both the secular front for its exclusionary discourses
and the Islamist community for its patriarchal viewpoints. In
this sense, their position as women intellectuals constantly
shifts between different critical standpoints and is hard to pin
down. This dynamic, hybrid critical position subjects them to
different vulnerabilities in different contexts. While their
veiling is seen as a threat in the secular front, their critical,
pro-feminist stance is harshly criticized in the patriarchal
Islamist community.
Pious women columnists' narratives disclose that margin-
alization of veiled women and violation of their rights is an
ongoing phenomenon in contemporary Turkey. Although pious
women columnists acknowledge the positive effects of the
promising legal steps that have been taken recently to improve
the status of veiling in society, they underline that these legal
achievements do not guarantee the elimination of discrimina-
tory discourses from society altogether. The cautious tones in
their narratives clearly bring into the open the entrenched
character of threat perceptions in pious selves.
Another prominent aspect in pious women columnists'
narratives is the critique of essentialist conceptions of identity
labels and the unique conception of Islamic feminism. Their
narratives on Islam, feminism, and Islamic feminism expose
novel ways in which the relationship between Islam and
feminism can be redefined through a dialectical approach. The
anti-essentialist critique here promises a significant potential
to deconstruct the orthodox arguments defining Islam and
feminism in binary opposition. Yet, on the other hand, it is
striking to note that at certain points, pious women columnists'
criticisms of secular feminism tend to reproduce essentialist,
streotypical accounts of feminism in public discourses. Their
coding of feminism as anti-family, anti-motherhood, or as
inherently monolithic and exclusionary does not comply with
their anti-essentialist critique of fixed identity categories. This
contradictory stance can be seen as a rhetorical choice utilized
by pious women columnists to stress the distance between
the secular feminist position and the peculiarities of their
positionality.
Despite the essentializing, streotypical reproduction of anti-
feminist public discourses in their narratives, one can argue
that piouswomen columnists' critiques of both Republican and
Islamist patriarchies and their attempts to reconcile Islam and
feminism in a dialectical relationship render them potential
allies of the secular feminist subaltern public. The pro-feminist
tones in their narratives may imply a possibility of forming
a coalition politics against the proliferation of anti-feminist
discourses in contemporary Turkey. In this sense, piouswomen
columnists' narratives constitute a critical discursive terrain
where the visibility of profeminist discourses can be reinforced
vis-a-vis the patriarchal gender regime and an active collabo-
ration with secular feminist subaltern publics can be fostered.
Yet, one should note that the Islamic feminist collaboration
with secular feminist subaltern publics can be fully realized
only if this collaboration is enhanced through an inclusive
approach going beyond the essentializing limits of religious
dictates. The dialectical expansion that materializes in a variety
of strategic tactics and self-adopted labels in pious women
columnists' narratives, such as “fragile feminist” or “thinking
feminist,” can greatly contribute to this ideal of inclusivity. It can
bolster cooperation on pressing gender issues in contemporaryTurkey, such as women's sexuality, motherhood, and repro-
ductive rights. In a nutshell, one can conclude that despite their
limitations, pious women columnists' narratives on feminism
and feminist identity have the potential of fostering a coalitional
feminist politics against the rise of anti-feminist discourses in
contemporary Turkey.
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Endnotes
1 AKP's attempts to introduce a bill criminalizing adultery turned into a
major crisis between the Turkish government and the European Union. As a
result of the rising controversies, the proposed adultery law was withdrawn.
2 In an interview that she gave to the feminist journal Pazartesi in 1995,
Sibel Eraslan, an activist and writer, openly criticizes themale hegemony in the
Welfare Party. See Arat (2004).
3 See http://basortuluadayyoksaoydayok.wordpress.com/basintoplantisi.
Women activists as well as veiled women columnists who supported the
campaign stated that political actions necessary for granting veiled women the
right to be elected should not be delayed any more and all political parties,
particularly the AKP, should take action against the violation of this
fundamental human right.
4 See Karaca (2012), Tuksal (2012), Ramazanoğlu (2012).
5 See Tuksal (2010), Karaca (2010)
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